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Abstract
While accountability has gained significant traction within the contemporary discourse on disaster governance, what it
means and takes to be ‘doing accountability’ in promoting democratic governance of disasters remain scantly understood.
Using the concept of social accountability and drawing on an ethnographic case study of a civil society-led accountability
campaign in post-earthquake Nepal (the Mobile Citizen Help Desk, or MCHD), this article shows how MCHD sought to
amplify local voices regarding failures in aid delivery and expanded opportunities for dialogue between disaster-affected
communities and local powerholders. It highlights the potential of such initiative in safeguarding and promoting the rights
of disaster-affected communities, while also helping overcome the post-disaster environment of mistrust, unfounded alle-
gations and power inequalities. The article also draws attention to the challenges facing such an initiative. It shows that the
effectiveness of such efforts in translating citizens’ voices into state response was undermined by: (i) its incorporation into
a donor-driven humanitarian accountability initiative, in which generating and reporting feedback to donors proved more
pressing than amplifying citizen voice; and (ii) unclear structures of governance at the local level of service delivery, which
impeded the civil society actors’ aim to engage with ‘the right authority.’ The article draws attention to the political poten-
tial of social accountability in a post-disaster context, while also raising caution that such activism is unlikely to succeed in
holding powerholders to account in the absence of supportive national bureaucratic and international aid structures.
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1. Introduction
The Nepal earthquakes of April 25 and May 12, 2015
proved to be a major humanitarian crisis that claimed
over 8,790 lives, injured over 22,300 and left more
than 2,8 million people homeless (Government of Nepal,
2015). The emergency response to the earthquake was
also characterised by public concerns over mismanage-
ment, exclusion and corruption in humanitarian aid dis-
tribution (Regmi, 2016), while the government made
explicit its plan to make the earthquake response partic-
ipatory and accountable to the disaster-affected citizens
(Government of Nepal, 2015).
That disasters are not just sites of human suffer-
ing but also spark citizen- or civil society-driven initia-
tives to challenge the top-down, state-driven model of
recovery and reconstruction is increasingly recognised
(Jalali, 2002; Schuller &Morales, 2012). Disaster-affected
citizens have been found to exploit disaster as a win-
dow of opportunity, demanding improved services and
accountability from the government, and using informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICTs) to expand
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the scope of inclusive and democratic response to the
humanitarian disasters (Curato, 2018; Hayward, 2014;
Meier, 2015; Mulder, Ferguson, Groenewegen, Boersma,
& Wolbers, 2016). Such societal invigoration was charac-
teristic to the 2015 Nepal earthquake. Beyond the imme-
diate environment of political contestation, several local
and international civil society organisations launched ini-
tiatives, with an explicit or implicit aim of making the
governance of the disaster inclusive and accountable
(McMurren, Bista, Young, & Verhulst, 2017). One such
initiative called Mobile Citizen Help Desk (MCHD) was
launched by two Nepal-based civil society organisations,
with the mission of what the organisers termed “people-
powered accountability” in Nepal’s earthquake response
and recovery.
This article presents an ethnographically oriented
case study of the MCHD. In so doing, it seeks to con-
tribute to the hitherto underexamined topic of the prac-
tice, potential and politics of civil society-based social
accountability in promoting democratic and inclusive
governance of disaster. The article first discusses key
theoretical and practical underpinnings, together with
recent critiques of social accountability, in the interest
of framing the overall aim of this study. The article then
explores the possibilities and limitations of the MCHD as
a form of social accountability in the post-disaster con-
text. The discussion section seeks to contribute to the
ongoing debates surrounding democratic governance of
post-disaster response and reconstruction.
1.1. Social Accountability: Aims, Actors and Approaches
Spurred by the long-standing concerns over the chron-
ic performance deficit facing the public and develop-
ment sector, social accountability has emerged as a
form of citizen and civil society-driven activism to mon-
itor the performance of powerholders and to hold
them accountable for the delivery, quality and rele-
vance of everyday public services (Gaventa & McGee,
2013; Goetz & Jenkins, 2005; Papp, Gogoi, & Campbell,
2013). According to Goetz and Jenkins (2005), demand-
ing accountability from powerholders is “inseparable
from the language of rights” and consists of efforts “to
obtain information, and to insist that officials engage
in public reason-giving and thus, by definition, impos-
es obligations on holders of power” (p. 182). Making
powerholders responsive to the everyday grievances of
the citizens regarding the quality and delivery of public
services, inefficiency and corruption, absenteeism and
delays, constitutes the core focus of social accountability.
Recent scholarship has tried to document various
forms of social accountability activism. Such activism has
been found to range from ordinary citizens resorting
to protests, to the naming and shaming of public offi-
cials to expose them for their wrongdoings (Peruzzotti
& Smulovitz, 2002). Others have documented how local
communities in resource-constrained environments take
an assertive approach to tackling chronic neglect and
indifference from frontline officials (Hossain, 2010).
In contrast to the more confrontational approaches,
social accountability also involves citizens and public offi-
cials developing collaborative strategies to monitor the
delivery of public goods and leverage local information
to tackle public-sector underperformance (Björkman
& Svensson, 2009; Caseley, 2006). Such efforts often
involve active engagement of local civil society actors
to improve decision-making concerning the design and
delivery of local services in a context marred by cor-
ruption and a governance deficit (Webb, 2012). Other
forms of social accountability attempt to evoke moral
responsibility among local authorities to respond to local
demands, mainly when the formal systems of account-
ability are non-existent or weak (Tsai, 2007), and encour-
age mutual recognition of the rights of citizens and
responsibilities of the state (Bukenya, 2016).
1.2. Politics of Social Accountability
Notwithstanding the potential and developments men-
tioned earlier, recent studies have called attention to
the local and international conditions that tend to under-
mine the potential of social accountability in bring-
ing public sector reforms (Gaventa & McGee, 2013;
Joshi, 2014).
Scholars acknowledge that citizen-driven account-
ability activism that promotes information and trans-
parency in government operations (e.g., open gov-
ernment, audit reports, legislative hearings, complaint
offices) do not necessarily follow through to improved
conduct of powerholders. According to Fox (2007),
transparency-based approaches, at best, are limited to
producing accountability in the form of institutional
answerability, but not sanctions in the event of underper-
formance or abuse of power. With civil society or local
NGO actors often spearheading social accountability ini-
tiatives, the influence of international aid structures over
the agenda and agency of local NGO actors also deserves
attention. Scholars have argued that the unequal nature
of partnerships within the aid sector often compels aid-
recipient southern NGOs to privilege upward account-
ability to northern donors, at the cost of both learnings
from interventions and downward accountability to com-
munities they claim to serve (Ebrahim, 2005; Makuwira,
2006). Pressures to conform to a rigid reporting, mon-
itoring and evaluation of aid interventions along spe-
cific indicators and measures have further reproduced
power inequalities between northern and southern aid
actors (Biradavolu, Blankenship, George, & Dhungana,
2015; O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014), eroding
local actors’ ability to pursue “locally-intelligentmeans of
programme improvement” (Shukla, Teedon, & Cornish,
2016, p. 14).
The potential of social accountability activism also
needs to be understood within the long-standing push
by the international aid actors to deploy different stan-
dards and technologies of humanitarian accountabili-
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ty (CHS Alliance, Group URD, & The Sphere Project,
2014; Sandvik, Jumbert, Karlsrud, & Kaufmann, 2014;
The Sphere Project, 2011). Critics, however, argue that
accountability within international humanitarian gov-
ernance is excessively driven by the interests of aid
actors and their experts, at the expense of locally-driven
accountability approaches (Barnett, 2013). A growing
scholarly concern is that the ongoing global push to
promote accountability and participation in disaster
preparedness and response is hardly matched by its
community-level operationalisation (Raju & da Costa,
2018). Under donor-induced technologies of humani-
tarian accountability, the voice of local communities is
misrepresented as mere feedback to bring short-term
reforms in aid projects (Madianou, Ong, Longboan, &
Cornelio, 2016), masking the longer-term and political
nature of accountability demands emanating from crisis-
affected communities.
A related concern is also over the growing deploy-
ment of ICTs such as web portals, crowdsourcing tech-
niques, mobile-based reporting and feedback and social
media platforms to improve the public sector and aid gov-
ernance. In reviewing a range of ICT-enabled initiatives,
Peixoto and Fox (2016) found that many of such actions
that claim themselves as social accountability are limit-
ed to collection and reporting of administrative data, as
opposed to challenging unequal power relations at the
level of service delivery. The generation of a varied and
vast amount of data or feedback through ICTs run the risk
of entering a “black hole” (McGee, Edwards, Anderson,
Hudson, & Feruglio, 2018, p. 11), exposing the weakness-
es inherent in such tools in promoting community con-
trol over decision-making. Although ICTs in the forms
of crowdsourcing techniques and mapping of communi-
ty needs are increasingly deployed under the rubric of
feedback-driven humanitarian action, they tend to fall
short of empowering communities in their right to know
about the nature and delivery of concrete humanitarian
aid (Mulder et al., 2016). An emerging scholarly consen-
sus is that the collection of data or feedback is neither
matched by willingness of authorities to empower local
communities nor in their capacity to respond to commu-
nity feedback, which, in turn, tends to fuel mistrust and
cynicism among local communities (Herringshaw, 2017;
Madon, 2014; Peixoto & Fox, 2016).
Despite this emerging evidence, how ordinary citi-
zens or civil society actors pursue social accountability
activism within the contentious climate of humanitari-
an disasters, and its potential and limitations in shap-
ing the governance of post-disaster response and recov-
ery, remains scantly understood. The article seeks to
address this gap, using the 2015 Nepal earthquake as an
empirical context, which sparked various forms of civil
society-induced, ICT-enabled social accountability initia-
tives. In so doing, the article uses Jonathan Fox’s defi-
nition of social accountability, involving two synergistic
metaphors, “voice” and “teeth” (Fox, 2015). The voice
here constitutes everyday grievances and demands of
service recipients, expressed through collective action by
service recipients themselves, or through local civil soci-
ety or NGOs. Teeth represent the governmental capac-
ity to respond to citizens’ voice. As Fox (2015) argues,
“voice needs teeth to have a bite—but teeth may not
bite without voice” (p. 357). Using this conceptualisation
and drawing on an ethnographic case study of MCHD,
the study seeks to interrogate both the potential of
voice-based, social accountability in a disaster context,
together with the bureaucratic and governance capaci-
ty (‘teeth’) in responding to citizen voice. Before intro-
ducing the case, a brief overview of the Nepali con-
text follows.
1.3. The 2015 Nepal Earthquake and its Context
The 2015 Nepal earthquakes, as previously noted, not
only wrought major human suffering but also brought
to the public discourse the demands for account-
able, resilient and participatory governance of disas-
ters (Government of Nepal, 2015; Lam & Kuipers, 2019).
The immediate response to the earthquake was con-
cerned with rescue and relief involving a range of nation-
al and international aid actors, and local volunteers. The
emergency phase was followed by recovery and recon-
struction programmes, which included provisions for
cash assistance and housing reconstruction, among oth-
ers (Government of Nepal, 2016). Given the differential
impacts of the earthquake, the expectations and needs
of the affected communities varied across the 14 highly
affected districts with diverse socio-economic contexts.
The aftermath of the Nepal earthquake also saw
intense public concerns over misallocation, exclusion
and corruption in the delivery of humanitarian aid
(Regmi, 2016). The early responders to the crisis had
to confront intense public demands for transparent and
inclusive aid delivery, while also complying with the
government’s bureaucratic standards of performance
(Dhungana & Cornish, 2019). The contention over the
governance of the Nepal earthquake response, howev-
er, was hardly independent of the pre-disaster political
and governance context of Nepal. As previous research
has shown, the governance aspirations and practice
of the Nepal earthquake were impacted by, and, in
turn, impacted the pre-existing political environment of
state-societal mistrust and scepticisms (Yuldashev, 2018).
The earthquake struck Nepal at the time when the coun-
try was going through a significant political transition,
having experienced a ten-yearMaoist conflict and recent-
ly ushered into a republic set-up following the overthrow
of theHinduMonarchy. The Constituent Assembly,which
was expected to transfer the country from a centralised
unitary mode of governance to the federal system of
governance, having failed to draft the constitution once,
continued to struggle in promulgating the new constitu-
tion. The implementation of the ‘good governance’ agen-
da that had gained renewed attention after the end of
the Maoist insurgency had suffered a setback, owing to
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lack of representation and participation of historically
disadvantaged citizens in the local decision-making bod-
ies (Sharma, 2012). At the local level, democratic vac-
uum persisted, with the country having failed to hold
local elections in two decades. In the absence of elected
representatives, the emergency response to the earth-
quake at the local level was coordinated by government
bureaucrats, raising serious challenges over the repre-
sentation of local demands, as further discussed in the
findings section.
However, this is not to suggest that the emergency
response to the earthquake occurred under a complete
policy and governance vacuum. The Nepal earthquake
response saw the government activating or launching var-
ious forms of governance and legislative reforms, and,
according to some scholarship, even served as an impetus
to promulgate the new constitution in September 2015,
less than six months after experiencing themajor human-
itarian crisis (Yuldashev, 2018). The emergency response
was coordinated by the Home Ministry and couched in
various pre-existing policy and regulatory measures such
as the Natural Calamity (Relief) Act of 1982, the National
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Policy, the National
Strategy for Disaster Risk Management, 2009 (Daly,
Ninglekhu, Hollenbach, Barenstein, & Nguyen, 2017;
Government of Nepal, 2016), together with other gover-
nance frameworks such as the Development Cooperation
Policy of 2014 and the Good Governance (Management
and Operations) Act, 2008, with the aim to bring unifor-
mity and regularity in aid response (Dhungana & Cornish,
2019). Besides, the Post Disaster Needs Assessment,
which was conducted in the immediate aftermath of
the earthquake made explicit the plan to ‘build back
better’ Nepal, by setting up feedback- and grievance-
handling mechanisms to promote local participation in
earthquake recovery and reconstruction (Government of
Nepal, 2015). Despite these commitments, the Nepal
earthquake saw localised and collaborative efforts to
attend to the humanitarian needs confronting a major
setback amidst the government’s attempt to take con-
trol over the recovery (Wolbers, Ferguson, Groenewegen,
Mulder, & Boersma, 2016). There is now a growing
body of evidence that shows how, despite the original
policy commitment, the government marginalised local
participation in the decision-making, as the planning
and decision-making became increasingly centralised
and standardised under the command of the National
Reconstruction Authority (Daly et al., 2017; Dhungana, in
press ; Lam & Kuipers, 2019).
Despite this broader context and challenges, civil
society actors’ attempt to promote participation and
accountability in the earthquake response constitutes a
noteworthy feature of the 2015 Nepal earthquake. The
conditions under which such initiatives unfolded, their
role, potential and challenges, however, have been a sub-
ject of little scholarly attention. The rest of the article
seeks to address this gap, drawing on an ethnographic
case study of MCHD, as introduced below.
2. Methodology
2.1. The Case: Mobile Citizen Helpdesk
According to Simons (2009), a case study is “an in-depth
exploration from multiple perspectives of the complex-
ity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, insti-
tution, programme or system in a ‘real life’ context”
(p. 21). The current studywas designed as an ethnograph-
ic case study ofMCHD, an accountability campaign spear-
headed by two Nepal-based NGOs, Accountability Lab
(AL) and Local Interventions Group (LIG). Both AL and
LIG are youth-based civil society organisations, with a
history of organising information-based, technologically-
oriented transparency and accountability activism in
Nepal’s development sector.
For Simons (2009), a case study design is based
on the unique characteristics of the specific policy or
programme under investigation. As such, two distinct
aspects of the MCHD informed the selection and analy-
sis of the study. First, the MCHD was launched as an
independent, civil society initiative in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake, with an explicit mission to
promote, what the organisers termed “people-powered
accountability.” This feature offered a suitable lens
through which the aims, aspirations and struggles of
the MCHD actors could be examined. Second, the cam-
paign was initially launched as a small initiative, mobilis-
ing local monitors, while also leveraging ICTs (SMS-based
reporting, crowdsourcing of local grievances and report-
ing of feedback). Later, the organisers expanded the out-
reach of the campaign, having secured funding from
an internationally mandated feedback project called
Common Feedback Project (CFP). The CFP and MCHD
forged a partnership to leverage pre-existing local net-
works and experiences of AL and LIG in the 14 highly
affected districts. This partnership served as a critical
window to examine the areas of consistencies and con-
tradictions inherent in the global and local aspirations for
accountability in the disaster context.
2.2. Fieldwork, Data Sources and Analysis
The case study followed a focused ethnographic
approach of data collection involving short-term yet
intensive fieldwork comprising a range of data sources
(Knoblauch, 2005). Amongst various activities performed
under the MCHD, the use of focused ethnography here
involves an intensive study of the twomain activities: the
administration of micro-perception surveys and commu-
nity meetings.
The author conducted the fieldwork for this study
from January to May 2016. It involved sixteen in-depth
interviews, comprising staff, activists and affiliates direct-
ly involved with the MCHD, and three government
officials working in the field of right to information,
anti-corruption and public-sector accountability, with
close knowledge of the MCHD. Interviews with the
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MCHD actors and affiliates mostly focused on captur-
ing their motivation of and experiences in initiating and
implementing the campaign, their struggles in engaging
with local authorities and aid actors, and their sense
of accomplishments and limitations in serving in the
capacity of local monitors. The interviews with three
government officials were mainly concerned with under-
standing the general context of accountability-related
reforms and challenges facing Nepal, before and after
the earthquake.
The study also draws on participant observation
of the everyday activities of the campaign organis-
ers in the Kathmandu office, including attendance at
various formal and informal meetings and workshops.
The Kathmandu Office of the MCHD was a major hub,
from where most of the field activities were organised
and coordinated, offering more in-depth insights into
the ways of practising accountability. Participant obser-
vations in the Kathmandu office also involved interac-
tions with the staff and collaborators of the campaign in
a more casual setting.
Besides, the fieldwork also involved two group inter-
views with community monitors and district coordina-
tors in two earthquake-affected districts. The group dis-
cussions sought to uncover local-level possibilities and
challenges in implementing the campaign, coupled with
understanding the local monitors’ sense of successes,
struggles and frustrations. A review of key campaign-
related documents such as progress reports to the
donors, website materials, terms of reference and guide-
lines for local staff and various iterations of community
feedback reports complemented the analysis.
The LSE’s Ethics Committee granted ethical approval
for the study. Interviews were conducted upon securing
informed consent from the interviewees, and they lasted
for up to 90minutes. The names of the two organisations
involved in the campaign are disclosed with permission
from the main coordinators of these organisations, but
the identities of individual interviewees are withheld, as
per the original ethical approval.
For Simons (2009), the organising and analysis of
ethnographic data are to “begin at the beginning”
(p. 119). Accordingly, the majority of field notes from
participant observations were written while in the field.
The intuitive memos, or initial interpretations, while
carefully distinguished from the main observations or
data, were developed focusing on what seemed inter-
esting, what struck as significant, odd or puzzling and
howdifferent pieces of information related to each other
(Simons, 2009). To ensure necessary rigour and validity
to data analysis, the analysis then carefully followed the
ethnographic analytical techniques proposed by Gobo
(2008) and LeCompte and Schensul (2013). The analy-
sis involved detailed and repeated reading, and coding
of three sets of data aided by the NVivo 11 software,
based on the original aim of understanding the poten-
tial and limitations of social accountability in a post-
disaster context.
3. Findings
The findings are divided into two main parts. The first
describes the role and practice of social accountability in
terms of its potential for building local voice and secur-
ing the state’s response (teeth), while the second part
draws attention to two main impediments facing MCHD.
Findings are substantiated by individual and group inter-
view quotes, identified as INT for interviews, GINT 1 and
GINT 2 for two group interviews, and OB for the observa-
tion notes.
3.1. Putting Social Accountability into Practice
3.1.1. Bridging the Supply-Demand Gap through Local
Monitoring
The MCHD was initially set up with a vision of what
the organisers called “people-powered accountability.”
It was established as a “virtual space” of aid monitor-
ing, leveraging ICTs in the forms of SMS-based report-
ing, crowdsourcing of grievances, and mobilisation of
a network of community monitors, called Community
Frontline Associates (CFAs). The role of CFAs was to
build an environment of community vigilance against
potential exclusion, misuse and corruption of humani-
tarian resources. As the main strategy, the MCHD cam-
paign engaged investigative journalists because of their
“influence and power” at the community level. Although
the topic demands future investigation, several of the
CFAs were also involved in the informal networks of
local volunteers, who worked closely with the local gov-
ernmental and non-governmental relief and recovery
agencies, including the humanitarian clusters working
in areas of housing, water and sanitation, food securi-
ty, etc. The local embeddedness of the CFAs and their
ability to “extract and publicise information” was con-
sidered pivotal to bring transparency in local aid dis-
tribution. The interviewees concurred that, since the
majority of the CFAs came from the earthquake-affected
communities, who in many instances were themselves
the survivors of the earthquake, they were unique-
ly suited to capturing and publicising grievances of
local communities.
3.1.2. Information as Aid Entitlement
For theMCHD campaigners, the unprecedented influx of
humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the Nepal earth-
quake was not accompanied by credible information:
what the aid items entail, whom the aid is primarily tar-
geted to, from whom it was provided, and how it could
be availed. For interviewees, such ambiguity in aid distri-
bution constituted amajor accountability gap. One recur-
ring example raisedwas that concerning access to “victim
cards” issued by the government. Although ownership of
the victim card was a prerequisite for securing cash and
other forms of assistance from the government and aid
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agencies, many affected households were described as
either unaware about or uncertain to the future benefits
that its ownership guaranteed. As one of the campaign
organisers stressed, making local communities aware of
the value of such documentation was intrinsic for the
local communities to claim future entitlements:
It is difficult to make people realise that information
is more useful than rice. Information gives you power,
and that gives you empowerment to go to the govern-
ment and say give me this, and I have the right to this.
Another thing we do a lot is how people get the vic-
tim card. People don’t realise how important it is to
get the victim card. Ricewill finish. But empowerment
and information are something that will stay with you.
(INT, 24/02/2016)
The approach of promoting information as aid entitle-
ment evolved, as the overall disaster response itself shift-
ed from immediate rescue and relief effort to future
recovery. One of the main organisers of the MCHD
described this shift as performing the role between “eyes”
and “ears”.While “eyes” herewas suggestive of being vigi-
lant about the sources of and discrepancies in aid delivery,
“ears” meant being sensitive to the demands, grievances
and criticisms prevalent in local communities.
3.1.3. Bringing Voice to the Attention of the “Right
Authority’’
For theMCHD actors, the massive response to the Nepal
earthquake also brought with it the risk of aid resources
being misappropriated and misused. The role of the
MCHD campaign was articulated as promoting local vig-
ilance against possible aid diversion and misappropria-
tion, while also providing communities with a channel to
raise their concerns “to the right authority”:
I think whatever problem we see in Nepal, the main
cause is the lack of accountability. There is corruption,
mismanagement, misuse of public funds and these
are all linked to accountability. I don’t think people
question the right authority. People are always rais-
ing questions, but they are not raising questions to
the right authority. So we have started to work on this.
(INT, 07/03/2016)
For the above interviewee, the public concerns regard-
ing corruption and misappropriation of public resources
were historically prevalent. Yet, the influx of aid
resources following the earthquake injected a renewed
sense of urgency to address such concerns. One mech-
anism through which the MCHD sought to address this
concern was through local meetings, designed to pro-
vide local communities with the opportunity to voice
their concerns. Local officials, in turn, could provide jus-
tifications of their actions or inactions. In articulating the
relevance of such meetings, one interviewee noted that,
in many instances, communities’ grievances were limit-
ed to “tea-stall conversation”, which typically escaped
the attention of local authorities. For this interviewee,
community meetings served to amplify the “tea-stall
conversation” into a public conversation. Proceedings
of such meetings were captured and circulated through
local media and community radio stations affiliated with
the campaign. Not only were suchmeetings described as
essential in amplifying local voice for improved humani-
tarian services, but theywere also considered instrumen-
tal in tackling growing cynicism and complacency facing
affected populations:
The civil space that we created in the form of commu-
nity meetings are like, the more you interact with the
government, the more you know about the services
you are entitled to. If that is not done, citizens will say,
it is going on, and it will continue like that, nobodywill
bother to demand more. (INT, 21/03/2016)
Several interviewees acknowledged that organising local
spaces did not guarantee immediate redressal of local
concerns. Yet, for the community monitors, such meet-
ings had merit on their own, providing local communi-
ties with the opportunity to exercise their intrinsic right
to demand information and voice concerns regarding the
ongoing delays facing disaster recovery.
3.1.4. Promoting Local Engagement amidst Growing
Mistrust
As described in the introductory section, the post-
earthquakeNepal proved to be a contested environment,
bringing to the centre of the public discourse transparen-
cy, corruption and misappropriation in aid response.
Faced with slow and uneven aid response, coupled with
historical mistrust in local authorities, local communi-
ties often accused local officials of neglect, underperfor-
mance and misuse of relief funds.
The MCHD actors sought to cast their role in a sep-
arate light. Instead of resorting to blaming, alleging and
scapegoating individual public officials, the MCHD actors
articulated their role within disaster context as promot-
ers of an environment of dialogue and understanding.
During one of the group discussions, a community mon-
itor claimed how the exchange of “real information” at
the local level helped ease local environment charac-
terised by “rumours” regarding corruption and discrim-
ination in aid allocation. By organising “civic spaces,” the
MCHD sought to both overcome the local environment of
rumours and allegations, while also upholding the affect-
ed communities’ right to know about aid distribution.
3.2. Politics of Translation of Community Voice into
a Response
The findings thus far cast a positive spotlight in the way
the MCHD conceived and pursued social accountability
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in post-earthquake Nepal. However, the study also high-
lights the conditions that affect such practice and its
effectiveness, particularly in terms of translating commu-
nity ‘voice’ into ‘teeth’ from local powerholders.
3.2.1. De-Politicisation of Voice and Rights through
Humanitarian Technologies
The MCHD campaign, as previously mentioned, was
launched with a political mission of “people-powered
accountability,” geared at altering unequal power rela-
tions at the local level of aid delivery. As one of the co-
convenors mentioned, theMCHD campaign was focused
on “hyper-localisation of information” through a range
of strategies such as “follow the money,” crowdsourc-
ing of local complaints, and organisation of communi-
ty meetings. These strategies were expected to improve
community vigilance over aid distribution, amplify local
grievances and empower local communities to demand
concrete action from the local authorities. However, the
process of promoting “hyper-localisation of information”
took a technocratic turn as the campaign became increas-
ingly embedded with the monitoring logic of CFP, as fur-
ther elaborated below.
The CFP was an internationally funded humanitar-
ian feedback project that the MCHD received funding
from and became part of after operating for a fewweeks
as a much smaller-scale campaign. The CFP, in turn,
had its origin in the Communicating with Communities
Working Group, a globally mandated platform, involving
key humanitarian actors. One of the aims of CFP was
to promote two-way communication between disaster-
affected communities and humanitarian actors, using
contextually relevant tools of monitoring and com-
munity engagement (Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs & Nepal UN Resident Coordinator’s
Office, 2015, p. 2). LikeMCHD, the CFPwas also informed
by the principles of community engagement, informa-
tion collection andmonitoring. But, in practice, the CFP’s
treatment of and approach towards information and
monitoring deviated from, and subsequently interfered
with, how the MCHD actors saw the potential of data in
promoting “people-powered accountability.”
As part of the partnership between MCHD and CFP,
the local monitors, or CFAS, were responsible for con-
ducting micro-perception surveys on a bi-monthly basis.
Feedback was to be collected from the earthquake-
affected communities about their perceptions in how
humanitarian activities in areas of housing, cash provi-
sions, food services, among others, were being executed
at the local level. The processing of feedback, in turn, was
done by the donor itself. Dissemination of the feedback
was done through a commonweb portal, as well as in the
formof summary reports, whichwere routinely circulated
in the meetings of donors and government officials such
as the Community Engagement Working Group meetings.
While the MCHD actors did not resent collection
and dissemination of community feedback in itself, they
expressed ambiguity as to how the large volume of
reports and “success stories” so generated were act-
ed upon to inform future aid programming. Take, for
instance, the following comment:
The donor tells us that we need these many reports,
these many success stories, but I don’t think the
reports are being used. I don’t even know why they
want daily reports. Even for them, the daily reports
are the same. How do they analyse up to 70 reports
a day? And most of them are in the Nepali language.
I used to go home and try to work on those reports
even at home. But later I stopped doing it. I used to
askmy colleagues how they used the reports, forwhat
purpose? And nobody knew. (INT, 25/02/2016)
The routine collection of community feedback also led
to the MCHD actors questioning their sense of agen-
cy and power within the aid partnership. When asked
to describe how they see the role of the MCHD actors
within the aid partnership, one of the campaign’s co-
conveners offered the following reflection:
If I have to say in frank words, we are contractors.
Like, if you are building a house, you have to get
bricks, you have to bring various construction mate-
rials, you don’t go around buying them on your own.
You get hold of a contractor, and the contractor will
bring someone to work as a builder, a carpenter and
so on. We are the contractor [for the donor]. (INT,
03/02/2016)
The term “contractors” here evokes a technical role
of managing the local surveyors and routine collection
and reporting of data. As other interviewees also con-
curred, under the aid partnership the MCHD campaign
became limited to an administrative project involving
a mechanical exchange of data and reports, and occa-
sional negotiation of operational changes, budgeting
decisions with the funder. Such administrative activi-
ties came at the expense of amplifying the local voice
and enabling local communities with the information to
demand aid entitlements.
A striking tension ensued when, as part of the part-
nership, the CFP required the community monitors to
collect the feedback using smartphone technologies.
A two-day workshop was organised in Kathmandu to
orient the CFAs to the techniques and practicalities of
collecting real-time community feedback through smart-
phones. The stated goal of the mobile-based surveys
was to bring efficiency and accuracy in the collection
and dissemination of community feedback. Amidstmuch
enthusiasm, quick piloting of the mobile-based surveys
was done in Kathmandu, and soon afterwards, the
mobile-based feedback surveyswere rolled out across 14
earthquake-affected districts.
Although the interviewees concurred that the intro-
duction of mobile-based surveys brought enhanced effi-
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ciency in collecting and reporting feedback, which in the
past was conducted in paper formats, they mentioned
having struggled to cope with the undue pressure to
comeupwith timely and error-free feedback. They raised
questions over specific aspects of technology-induced
feedback collection that the CFAs saw having little rele-
vance to building voice at the local level. As one example,
the mobile-based surveys required mandatory recording
of the exact field location of surveys, to ensure quick
and accurate reporting and processing of community
feedback. For CFAs, however, this was an attempt to
bring increased surveillance over and discipline in survey
administration. Furthermore, it also represented a dwin-
dling level of trust between the central and the local staff.
A participant in one of the focus groups raised his con-
cern over the significance of the mobile-based feedback,
beyond its use as “a very good experiment”:
As I said, if we want to see this [mobile-based feed-
back] in a positive light, this is a very good experi-
ment. But if you look at it more negatively, this is the
case of not trusting. Whether one is in the field or
not, whether they are working from home or actu-
ally in the field. That I think is their focus. (GINT 2,
31/05/2016)
The CFAs expressed having struggled to comprehend
the importance accorded to their physical whereabouts
when the focus should be on listening to and publi-
cising local grievances. They raised concerns for being
increasingly put under technological surveillance, as the
campaign steadily shifted from monitoring the deliv-
ery of humanitarian aid to a project involved in the
monitoring of CFAs themselves. The Kathmandu-based
staff, in turn, were compelled to devote most of their
time orienting themselves about the technology-driven
techniques of data collection and reporting. A “Project
Manager” with “monitoring and evaluation” skills was
hired to monitor the unfolding of the mobile-based feed-
back survey closely. The reshuffling of staff was also felt
inevitable. The CFAs, who were initially valued for their
“influence and power” and their ability to “extract and
publicise information” at the local level, were consid-
ered increasingly incompatible with the growing tech-
nical demands of the time-bound, donor-funded feed-
back project.
As per the CFAs, the changing local context also
demanded an adaptive approach to the monitoring of
humanitarian performance. As most of the CFAs came
from journalistic and activist backgrounds, they saw the
mobile-based feedback collection along standardised
questions to have stifled the possibilities of ‘listening’
to, and pursuing and publicising stories that reflect the
changing demands and concerns of the local communi-
ties. The communitymeetings,which the CFAs concurred
of having been instrumental in promoting local scruti-
ny and engagement, were suspended without much con-
sultation with the CFAs. The MCHD convenors attribut-
ed this decision mostly to the lack of funding. This deci-
sion left the CFAs further detached from local communi-
ties, who they thought were becoming increasingly scep-
tical of the value of recurring feedback surveys. A CFA,
in one of the group discussions, reflected by saying that
communities probably consider them as government
“spies,” recurrently visiting earthquake-affected families
to take stock of “household wealth” to determine the
nature of aid for each household. Questions were raised
over the continuing insistence from the donor to cap-
ture local grievances along with pre-defined questions,
to the neglect of other ways of listening to community
grievances and rumours that were part of the original
practice of “people-powered accountability.”
3.2.2. Engaging with the “Right Authority”: Who is
Accountable to Whom?
As previously noted, a central goal of the MCHD cam-
paign was to build an environment of local vigilance. Part
of the effort was to ensure local grievances are respond-
ed to by “the right authority.” However, the actual prac-
tice of bringing local voice to the attention of “the right
authority” proved daunting, as the role and responsibili-
ty of local and central level agencies became ambiguous.
As one interviewee put it:
The main challenge after the crisis has been that
the line agency for VDCs is the Ministry of Local
Development and Federal Affairs. How about the
line agency that is responsible for earthquake recov-
ery? There is so much confusion, whether it is Home
[ministry], whether it is CDO [Chief District Officer],
whether it is LDO [Local Development Officer], or NRA
[National Reconstruction Authority]. Under whose
jurisdiction is disaster recovery? So, OK, we collect
grievances, who is supposed to address them? Only
if these grievances are addressed on time, then peo-
ple will start having trust [in the authority]. (INT,
18/04/2016)
The fact that the disaster response demanded sharing
of the public service delivery responsibility with a range
of domestic and international humanitarian agencies fur-
ther compounded the situation. A participant of a focus
group discussion expressed that the uncertainty in the
aid delivery role between NGO and state actors, and by
extension their authority and obligation to respond, also
added to their dilemma as accountability actors:
People even say that if the concerned authority does
not listen to our demands,wewill be forced to protest.
But the confusion is who that concerned authority
is? In the post-earthquake situation, there are two
major concerned authorities. First, there is the gov-
ernment, and then there are other relief agencies.
(GINT 1, 24/05/2016)
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Despite theMCHD actors’ awareness of growing commu-
nity grievances over sluggish recovery efforts, a lack of
clear lines of responsibility among government and non-
governmental agencies made it difficult for the MCHD
actors to build on community voice to demand action.
The transitioning political context of Nepal further
compounded the situation. As discussed in the introduc-
tory section, the earthquake struck Nepal when the local
bodies lacked elected representatives, posing a signif-
icant crisis of representation at the local level. In the
absence of elected representatives, the MCHD monitors
had to engagewith local bureaucrats, whom the intervie-
wees described having neither enough incentive nor the
authority to redress community concerns. They were pri-
marily concerned with coordination of local activities of
various governmental and non-governmental agencies.
Getting a response from local officials proved fur-
ther elusive as the disaster recovery efforts became fur-
ther centralised under the command of the National
Reconstruction Authority, a newly constituted national
body to oversee policy and programmatic aspects relat-
ed to disaster recovery. Although the CFAs view that
localised efforts such as community meetings were vital
to alleviate local level mistrust and misunderstanding,
they were sceptical about their ability to generate a con-
crete response to the satisfaction of local communities:
So when we do the community level meetings, we
mostly have VDC secretary as the lowest level govern-
ment official. But they cannot answer the questions.
They say this is all we know; this is all our authority.
They say ‘whatever [aid] we have received, we have
distributed them as per the rules and regulations of
the government.’ They also don’t give any assurance.
(GINT 1, 24/05/2016)
The interviewees described that the post-earthquake
environment was characterised by ambiguity in the roles
and responsibilities of various implementing agencies.
Such uncertainty, together with lack of elected officials,
and limited incentive and authority facing local gov-
ernment bureaucrats, posed a challenge for the MCHD
actors’ efforts to amplify local voice and demand action
from the authorities.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Although the 2015 Nepal earthquakes sparked major
public concerns over the governance of the disaster,
previous research has shown that the Nepali govern-
ment response fell short in offering concrete mech-
anisms for the affected populations to participate in
and scrutinise the response to the earthquake (Lam
& Kuipers, 2019). Furthermore, in more unequal and
resource-constrained societies such as Nepal, historical
mistrust in the public sector, the possibility of back-
lash from powerholders, and low level of public sector
responsiveness often serve as impediments for disad-
vantaged communities to participate in local decision-
making and exert pressures on powerholders (Gurung,
Derrett, Gauld, & Hill, 2017). The role of locally embed-
ded intermediary actors can, therefore, be instrumental
in cultivating local voice and vigilance in the delivery of
public goods (Herringshaw, 2017).
The present article underscores the potential of local
activists in serving in the role of such intermediary actors,
or what Twigg calls “accountably by proxy” (Twigg, 1999,
p. 55), scrutinising aid response and demanding the
state’s response on behalf of those who are disadvan-
taged in the face of a major disaster. Driven by the
vision of “people-powered accountability,” and mobilis-
ing a network of local monitors, the MCHD campaign
not only enabled the crisis-affected communities with
the right to know about aid entitlements but also sought
to bring local grievances to the attention of powerhold-
ers. The ‘proxy accountability role’ assumed by MCHD
actors is consistentwith the notion ofwhatNicole Curato,
through her ethnographic inquiry into the 2013 Typhoon
Haiyan in the Philippines, has termed “surrogate publics,”
spanning community activists and advocates who seek
to empower disaster-affected communities with voic-
es of “care” and “justice”(Curato, 2019, p. 54), and, in
so doing, promote democratic and inclusive governance
of disaster.
In the post-earthquake Nepali context, the proxy
accountability role of MCHD actors can be further illus-
trated by their approach to tackling the problem of
mutual voicelessness at the local level. Mutual voiceless-
ness here is suggestive of an environment in which the
disaster-affected communities faced a situation of grow-
ing uncertainty, primarily owing to an informational and
representational vacuum at the local level. Local author-
ities, in turn, were overburdened and had limited oppor-
tunity to engage with communities confronting major
crisis and uncertainty. As previous research has shown,
the uncertain nature of the Nepal earthquake response,
together with public perceptions regarding exclusionary
aid distribution, exposed the risk of local-level conflict
(De Juan, Pierskalla, & Schwarz, 2020). Such risk can hard-
ly be overlooked in a society with a recent history of vio-
lent conflict and fragile political situation. Besides, the
lack of participatory mechanisms constrained disaster-
affected communities’ ability to avail timely material aid
such as cash assistance, temporary shelters, etc., fuelling
an environment of local anxiety, rumours and allega-
tions. Through face-to-face meetings, or what one inter-
viewee termed “civil space,” the MCHD actors sought to
afford local communities with the platform to express
their everyday concerns and grievances. Local power-
holders, in turn, had the opportunity to render accounts
of their performance and dispel allegations. The arti-
cle shows the potential of localised social accountabili-
ty activism in promoting the rights and voice of disaster-
affected communities, while also helping overcome the
post-disaster environment ofmistrust, unfounded allega-
tions and power inequalities at the local level.
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Notwithstanding the above potential of civil society-
based social accountability in a disaster context, the arti-
cle draws attention to two key conditions that tend to
undermine the outcome of such accountability, particu-
larly when examined through the analytical lens of voice
and teeth (Fox, 2015).
First, the study shows the tendency of globally pro-
moted rationalities and technologies of humanitarian
accountability undermining locally embedded account-
ability activism. Through project partnership with global-
ly mandated CFP, a small-scale MCHD campaign was able
to command a national presence, mobilising an exten-
sive network of local monitors across 14 disaster-affected
districts. The partnership, however, came with a cost.
As the MCHD became increasingly embedded in the CFP,
it becamemyopic in scope (Ebrahim, 2005), with the local
monitors consumed with the task of routine collection
and reporting of community feedback as per the terms
of the partnership arrangement. The funding partnership
turned theMCHD campaign into a “thermostat approach
to accountability” (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 105), focused
on monitoring and self-correcting the performance of
humanitarian actors, while the possibilities of local
activists in promoting local voice and vigilance became
sidelined. Not only does such approach to accountabil-
ity represent a long-standing problem of the interna-
tional aid community in misrepresenting varied forms
of community voice as mere feedback (Madianou et al.,
2016), it also underscores how privileging technology-
induced surveys risks triggering undue tension among
pro-accountability activists, putting the collective vision
of “people-powered accountability” in serious jeopardy.
Second, despite theMCHD’s aim to promote “people-
powered accountability” on behalf of disaster-affected
communities, the potential of the localised accountabil-
ity campaign proved restrictive owing to the systemic
gap in Nepal’s public sector, together with lack of for-
mal participatory structures. In particular, the lack of
elected officials at the local level, coupled with grow-
ing centralisation of decision-making under the com-
mand of theNational Reconstruction Authority, emerged
as a challenge to engage with “the right authority.”
This lesson complements the growing body of literature
that underscores the limitations of civil society-driven
social accountability activism in the absence of support-
ive government structures and capacity (Peixoto & Fox,
2016, p. 35). A key lesson from this study is that pro-
accountability activists may need to be better prepared
at engaging with different types of anti-accountability
structures across varying levels of administrative scales
(Fox, 2016). In view of the fluid and elusive nature of
authority structures that take root in the post-disaster
context, as the article has shown, localised post-disaster
accountability activism may have to be complemented
by more assertive, advocacy-oriented measures that are
targeted to policy actors, legislatures and political rep-
resentatives, to broaden the scope of democratic gover-
nance of humanitarian disasters.
In sum, the article draws attention to the potential
of social accountability in making the notions of rights
and voice concrete in the interest of disaster-affected
communities, and in addressing the post-disaster envi-
ronment of mistrust, unfounded allegations and pow-
er inequalities. The article also concludes that the civil
society actors’ efforts to improve democratic governance
of disasters may prove limiting, unless there are corre-
sponding changes in the national and international struc-
tures of accountability in a post-disaster situation.
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